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 During the post-colonial period, the Sub Saharan region has witnessed a substantial number 
of violent conflicts, mostly within states between contending ethno-political entities manipulat-
ed by rivaling political elite groups. The problems within these so-called fragile or failed states 
are closely related to a lack of a ‘social contract’ between incumbent elite groups and 
constituent ethnic communities, which leads to political fragmentation, exacerbated by the 
interaction of diverse social, ethnic and resource exploitation-related issues. Inter-group 
violence in Sub Saharan Africa is therefore likely to be the outcome of a political process 
whereby some local groups take on other groups living in the same region, mostly as a proxy 
war for conflicts resulting from the uneven impact of state policies concerning resource 
exploitation. The cases of Niger and Senegal are presented as illustrative examples of this 
process of intra-state conflict escalation. It is concluded that the state in Sub Saharan Africa 
needs to reinvent itself; the incumbent state elite hould adopt a long-term perspective based 
on solidarity.  
  
Within the effort to identify and formulate an entire gamut of new challenges to human securi-
ty [1], and in the process of considering new clusters of causality, the interplay between 
different causes of conflict should not be overlooked. In Sub Saharan Africa the combination 
of the political exclusion of specific communities and ethnic groups in relation to a shared 
group perception of deprivation that results from political decision making has become an 
explosive cocktail that underlies many violent conflicts in the continent.  
Most present day political regimes are based on narrowly defined constituencies that 
support for – and are looked after by – political leaders of the day. Within a global economic 
context in which poor countries are relegated to the position of resource providers, the internal 
standoff between political elite groups and their respective constituencies is defined by the 
capacity of these states to distribute income to the various constituent groups. In most cases 
there is not enough to distribute among all groups and citizens. This results in a political 
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scramble for state-controlled resources that leads to violent conflict and generally ends in 
‘winner takes all’ scenarios which elevate regimes to monopolistic power positions that are 
extremely fragile to internal violent opposition based on clashes between marginalised groups. 
The problems of so-called fragile or failed states relates closely to a lack of a ‘social contract’ 
between incumbent elite groups and constituent ethnic communities leading to political frag-
mentation. In the present day situation, political entrepreneurs can easily mobilise large groups 
of mostly idle and poor youths, which in combination with free flowing small arms, leads to 
the formation of a conflict-prone environment in which raw power struggles thrive at the cost 
of humanitarian fallout and a perpetuation of cyclical exclusion of those who are associated 
with the losers of the various rounds of internal violence. 
In this short article, some examples of state versus internal opposition are highlighted. It is 
demonstrated that the lack of political discourse between protagonist elite groups ultimately 
leads to forms of violent resistance against the state. The challenge for incumbent regimes in 
Africa remains to engage in a peaceful political dialogue based on the principle of inclusiveness 
and equality of all communities living within a given state’s territory.   
Poverty and inequality in the contemporary political context 
Poverty is a widespread and persistent characteristic of all Sub Saharan African countries. 
Within most states there is a huge gap between a small elite group, an embryonic middle class 
and an impoverished mass of peasants and urban poor. In the wake of the political indepen-
dence of many African States, the former colonisers and other so-called advanced or devel-
oped states have initiated activities and programmes targeting the most deprived and poor 
segments of these societies. Although some improvements have been accomplished in the 
fields of health care, education as well as economic development, the material well-being of the 
vast majority of Africans has not improved substantially over this period. In fact, poverty 
remains the most pervasive feature of livelihood of Africans, urban and rural dwellers alike. 
During the post-colonial period, the Sub Saharan region witnessed a substantial number of 
violent conflicts, mostly within states between contending ethno-political entities manipulated 
by rivaling political elite groups. Regardless of the ideological facade of a given regime, the 
principles of co-optation and exclusion formed the basis of the prevailing political system. 
Political leaders in Sub Saharan Africa have held on to power, time and again, by mobilising 
client groups through the distribution of goods and services in order defend their interests in 
the face of resistance from contending elite groups or against incursions of outsiders. Behind 
the current crises and political disarray in many African States lies the complex interaction 
between various stakeholders with regards to the access to and struggle over the control of 
scarce economic resources. In many cases, poverty and inequality are perceived as the blatant 
and conscious result of purposeful policies of exclusion and discrimination initiated by the 
incumbent power elite of a particular ethnic, religious or linguistic group.  
Rural and urban poverty 
Sub Saharan Africa, despite a rapid urbanisation trend, currently remains overwhelmingly rural 
in character. Living conditions of the majority of people are harsh and largely dependent on 
climatic, physical natural conditions and a complex pattern of on-and-off farm activities 
involving different members of extended families seasonally employed in a whole range of 
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activities. In Sub Saharan Africa, furthermore, the prevailing agricultural techniques and 
livelihood strategies have remained virtually unchanged for a substantial period.  
Consequently, in the rural setting, poverty initially was not perceived as the outcome of 
power struggles between stakeholders in society since climatic and other structural factors had 
a more decisive impact on living conditions. Poverty in absolute terms therefore appears to 
relate to the predominant strategies of livelihood of different population groups and reflects 
the current state of development. Nevertheless, the ongoing process commonly referred to as 
‘land pressure’, due to steady growth of population and cattle, has led to increased scarcity and 
has shifted attention to political decision making in the rural context. Gradually, the struggle 
for access to natural resources (notably land, grazing areas and water) has emerged as a crucial 
issue in multiple parts of the Sub Saharan Region. Various stakeholders are involved in these 
struggles, including absentee owners of land and cattle who compete with local user groups for 
these scarce resources. If local users are confronted with powerful outsider elite groups closely 
linked to the state, violent conflicts will emerge more likely, as local elite groups will try to 
mobilise these constituencies into organised resistance movements.  
In the urban context, conditions are rapidly changing and traditional patterns of social 
networks tend to loose out to modern anonymous market relations between individuals. In this 
setting, poverty is personalised and hence individuals are more vulnerable to changes in their 
own livelihood opportunities. So-called power-brokers, emerging from among the ranks of 
disenfranchised politicians, opposition leaders or traditional leaders fearing loss of power, will 
try to capitalise upon the discontent of such urban poor.  
Resource competition 
Additionally, precious resources such as minerals or oil have become sources for intense 
political struggle between elite groups in most Sub Saharan States. These groups have 
repeatedly manipulated the existing ethnic diversity in order to enforce a military victory on 
adversaries, resulting in a proliferation of intrastate warfare. This process has emerged as a 
structural underpinning of some of the recent violent intrastate conflicts in the region (Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, to name two).  
In some cases, protagonist groups successfully try to take on the state in order to 
legitimise their claims on such precious resources. Such insurgencies can easily feed on the 
processes of marginalisation and deprivation of both rural and urban constituencies. In other 
cases the incumbent state elite manages to effectively protect its interests by using military 
force to repress the population and competing elite groups. In the latter case, the disenfran-
chised citizens have few options to survive in the formal economy, turning either to migration, 
to self-sufficiency in agriculture or to an activity from among a proliferation of alternative 
survival strategies (black marketeering, informal economy, smuggling). Moreover, control over 
the gains of economic exploitation of available natural resources as well as over the state 
apparatus itself tends to reinforce continuity in power for the elite group. Hence, efforts aimed 
at change, such as the recent democratisation trend, have met with strong resistance from the 
incumbent regimes in the various African states.  
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The impact of democratisation 
The democratisation trend in Sub Saharan Africa has sometimes resulted in power transfers 
but in many cases led to increased polarisation between population groups and to the 
emergence of violent conflicts. In this political context, states cannot live up to the 
expectations nor fulfill mandates that have emerged in the contemporary political landscape of 
the Western World. With the state actor neutralised as a potential mediator to sooth the 
inequality issue within the continent, the outcome of the poverty issue has become linked to 
that of the political power struggle itself. The prevailing mode of distribution of income and 
resources leaves little perspective for structural change in the short term. The question of 
inclusive governance has become crucial if the poverty issue is to be tackled effectively.  
Structural factors thus determine the impact of recent demographic and socioeconomic 
developments in the rural and the urban setting, which have progressively led to situations of 
scarcity in which stakeholders groups are confronting each other directly in a zero-sum 
confrontation. Mineral resources have added an extra dimension to this struggle as the 
incumbent state elite depends on the revenues from such resources to survive. The competi-
tion for access to such sources of income takes place at various levels; between stakeholders 
groups at the local level; between local groups and the state; and between competing elite 
groups at the state level. The following section highlights two examples of these different 
levels of conflict and aims to clarify a number of context-specific linkages between the 
different socioeconomic factors involved. The examples deal with the Tamajaq rebellion in 
Niger ad the Jola insurgency ni the Casamance region of Senegal. 
Two examples: Niger and Senegal 
The Tamajaq rebellion in Niger 
Root causes 
In Niger, at the end of the 1980s, a minority nomadic group, the Tamajaq, rebelled openly 
against the state in a bid for a more equitable resource distribution. Structural factors in this 
conflict were the historical formation of the state of Niger, whereby the erstwhile powerful 
Tamajaq groups had been militarily defeated at the beginning of the century by the French 
followed by the abolishment of slavery destroying the backbone of their political economy. 
The former rulers were thus marginalised in the process, reinforced during the independence 
when representatives from the southern Sub-Saharan peoples within the Niger territory took 
control of the newly emerging state.  
During the uranium boom of the late 1970s, the military head of state (Kountje) had 
focused primarily on state building endeavour through the instigation of the so-called ‘Société 
de Développement’. The entire society was divided in political sub-units which had to conform 
to socialist rhetoric whilst aiming to attain specific productivity levels. However, this ambitious 
social experiment failed to address the ethno-linguistic diversity of the country as well as the 
profound differences in livelihood strategies between agriculturists and herdsmen. Further-
more, the state proved incapable to diversify its sources of income and merely spent benefits 
of the uranium export in the construction of roads and government offices in the capital 
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Niamey. The successive post-independence governments failed to address the underlying 
problems of the fragile domestic economy. 
Throughout the post colonial period, land pressure within Niger gradually led to the 
disappearance of the buffer area between traditional agricultural and pastoral lands: the so-
called agricultural boundary had shifted northwards. This resulted in marginal agriculture in 
fragile ecological settings, in turn provoking land degradation, erosion and desertification. The 
traditional annual movements of cattle over large distances had become more hazardous as 
agriculturists over time had become agro-pastoralists, reserving harvest residues and other 
fodder for their own cattle, hence limiting possibilities for the transhumance movements [2]. 
The traditional nomadic livelihood strategy became endangered in this changing socioeconom-
ic setting.  
The effects of ecological crises 
The main triggering event for the Tamajaq rebellion was doubtless the deteriorating 
socioeconomic position of the nomadic peoples in general and the failure of the government 
to address grievances and to provide adequate emergency and follow up assistance in the 
aftermath of the consecutive draughts. The nomadic peoples had suffered greatly from the 
impact of the successive droughts in the early 1970s and 1984/1985 and large numbers fled to 
neighbouring countries, notably Algeria and Libya. The Nigerien head of state, Ali Saibou, who 
succeeded military dictator Kountje in 1987, promised a safe return to the Tamajaq refugees 
and reintegration into society, among other things, by offering resettlements fees, distribution 
of food and a number of cattle per family to enable restoration of stocking rates prior to the 
environmental calamities. The state proved incapable to fulfill these promises when the 
Tamajaq started to return in numbers, greatly increasing their ordeal. The ensuing frustrations 
provoked extremist activities in turn leading to some violent incidents whereby Tamajaq 
elements looted public facilities, pillaged village stores and public markets. These incidents 
were part of a broadly supported protest movement to which the government turned a deaf 
ear. Instead, the national army was used to repress Tamajaq discontent leading to incidents in 
which civilians were killed.  
The Tamajaq rebellion 
Under a strong military repressive state the differences between ethnic groups were somewhat 
dissimulated to resurface when the political climate allowed for the expression of divergent 
political opinions. This destabilised the fragile national unity of Niger leading to proliferating 
factionalism in an atmosphere of distrust towards the national army. During the National 
Conference, held in the second half of 1991, community leaders from the Tamajaq appealed 
for rehabilitation of their community but were humiliated instead. This triggered the outbreak 
of the rebellion, resulting in the launching of the ‘Front de la Libération de l’Air et de 
L’Azawak’ (FLAA). The National Conference, dominated by representatives of the student 
movement and sedentary ethnic communities, failed to take into account the feelings of 
frustration and marginalisation amongst the nomadic peoples.  
Within the Tamajaq community there was no unified strategy with a common goal. 
Various factions independently engaged security forces in different areas, making for a frag-
mented guerrilla war which the understaffed and badly armed national army could barely 
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contain. There were groups who favoured independence or far reaching autonomy whereas 
others claimed greater representation in the political domain as well as a fair share of resources. 
Disputes about the relative demographic weight of the Tamajaq as well as the demarcation of 
their homelands blocked a peaceful solution for a long period of time.  
Conclusion 
The major underlying factor of this political crisis was provoked by the livelihood crisis that 
confronted this erstwhile nomadic people. In the colonial setting in-built response mechanisms 
to crisis situations had gradually eroded and created a setting in which the Tamajaq had 
become vulnerable to climatic hazards. The combination of ecological crises, land pressure, 
loss of response mechanisms and the desire to maintain a proper cultural identity within a 
fragile national context of a state that failed to provide adequate support when it mattered, 
resulted in the Tamajaq quagmire.  
The Jola insurgency in the Casamance region of Senegal 
Root causes 
In the Casamance area of Senegal, a long standing dispute between the Jola and the Senegalese 
state has resulted in a protracted internal violent conflict that has lasted for over ten years. 
Structural factors underlying the conflict seem to be the nature of the mechanisms employed 
by the state to penetrate local society and to exercise political control. As the nature of political 
allegiance was brokered through a hierarchy of formal and informal elites (mostly Muslim 
marabouts), the Jola, who stand out as a rather egalitarian and socially unstratified society, were 
not effectively integrated in the national polity. The application of the new constitution, 
transferring previous communal land rights to the state, has had a profound impact on local 
customs and resource management in the Casamance region. Another outstanding feature of 
the Jola is their attachment to land (notably rice paddies) as they rely on a precarious ecosystem 
in the low coastal areas of the Casamance river estuarium allowing for a combination of rice 
cultivation, marginal fishing and cash-crop production of peanuts and cotton. Furthermore, 
the region is commonly seen as the breadbasket of the country so it can therefore hardly be 
labeled as poor if compared with other regions in Senegal. Within the region itself the Jola 
majority seems to be poorer than other ethnic groups residing in the Casamance area. This, 
however, can be partly attributed to traditional livelihood strategies reflecting Jola culture. A 
number of socioeconomic developments have resulted in the mobilisation of Jolas in violent 
opposition to the dominant Wolof ethnic group and to their ‘cronies’ residing in the Jola 
homeland, the Casamance region. The pivotal factors to be highlighted are the loss of control 
over important resources, the lay-offs in the public sector affecting Jola intellectuals, the fear of 
losing Jola cultural identity and the repression by the state. 
Loss of control over important resources 
The selective exploitation of fishery resources by foreign ethnic groups is resented by the Jola 
community. As a cumulative result of climatic deterioration and out-migration fishing, the 
Casamance river and the Atlantic Ocean have become a way to overcome the farming systems 
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crises. Although the indigenous fishermen are far more numerous than the immigrant Serer 
and Toucouleur fishermen who control large-scale specialised fishery and the distribution 
channels, they play only a marginal role in this type of fishery. The Senegalese State earns 
foreign currency with the export of shrimps and deep-sea fish. The Jola thus compete for the 
same resources. The result of this has been resentment between the Jola and Toucouleur 
communities. The Jola feel that other ethnic groups should have consulted with them prior to 
the exploitation of natural resources in the region as they consider themselves the legitimate 
owners. 
Lay-offs in the public sector 
Concurrently, the labour migration of young Jola to Dakar, an alternative livelihood strategy 
dating back to the 1950s, became hazardous as of the mid 1970s. The limits to the absorption 
of labour power in the Senegalese public sector and the subsequent lay-off of state personnel 
also left a large part of young urban Jola unemployed. Disappointment with the state among 
the educated casamancais led them to withdraw from the state and return to their villages of 
origin to settle as farmers. The initiative by the Senegalese state to incorporate at least part of 
this elite after the 1982 incidents was either not encompassing enough or too late.  
Fear of losing Jola cultural identity 
Then there was also the gradual penetration of the Wolof language and culture (modern music, 
food and dress) notably among the young Jolas. Since the independence Wolof replaced Creole 
as a lingua franca in the Casamance. The slow ‘Wolofisation’ has added to the grievances as in 
the national media Wolof predominates and regional culture is completely ignored. Perceived 
neo-colonialism combined with fear of losing one’s cultural identity in view of the ongoing 
‘Wolofisation’ of the youth has angered most Jola.  
State repression and violent conflict 
After the bloody confrontations of 1982 and 1983, in which over a hundred people died, the 
Senegalese state took an ambiguous stand towards the region. In order to counter the 
attraction of the newly emerging resistance movement MFDC (Mouvement des Forces 
Démocratiques de Casamance), the central government appointed several young casamancais 
in the local bureaucracy while simultaneously setting up a committee of wise men to address 
the underlying causes of the conflict. On the socioeconomic dimension, the establishment of 
development projects and agencies were an important priority for the State and the external 
donors to counter some of the underlying grievances. On the other hand, however, the state 
divided the Casamance region into two constituent entities, the smallest being the Jola 
inhabited Lower Casamance, effectively thwarting the MFDC independence movement’s claim 
to the entire region. Furthermore a campaign of repression was unleashed selectively against 
suspected supporters of the MFDC within the Jola community. As the local society is 
profoundly unranked in nature, the soothing effect of appointing some elements to positions 
within the administration was limited. They as well as other Jolas working on behalf of the 
central government were described as traitors by the MFDC movement. The repressive 
measures resulted in further support among the Jola for the MFDC cause. When in 1989 the 
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state of Senegal was confronted with internal and external threats [3], the MFDC chose to take 
on the state militarily. From that moment on, several rounds of hostilities have taken place. 
However, the civil war has caused enormous damage to the economic infrastructure of the 
region. Tourism consequently has diminished and even stopped completely for some years 
(1991-1992, 1992-1993).  
Conclusion 
Overall, the interplay between various socioeconomic factors plays an important role at the 
background of this violent conflict. The impact of the new constitution on land distribution, 
the expansion of modern economic activities (fisheries and tourism) mainly by immigrants 
ignoring local entitlements, the incapacity of the state sector to absorb newcomers on the 
labour market or to accommodate the casamancais otherwise combined with a longstanding 
perception of being slowly colonised, as exemplified by the penetration of Wolof culture, 
fuelled a strong sense of marginalisation and facilitated political mobilisation of Jolas by 
disenfranchised Jola intellectuals escalating into civil war. Again, poverty in and by itself does 
not account for the outbreak of conflict in the case of the Casamance region in Senegal. This 
case clearly demonstrates the interplay between the various levels of conflict present in Sub 
Saharan Africa.  
Assessing the role of poverty with regard to the outbreak of violent conflict 
With regard to poverty as an independent contributing factor to the outbreak of violent 
conflict, one needs to take the predominant structural characteristics of resource allocation and 
wealth accumulation within states into account. The level of poverty in absolute terms can not 
be directly related to the emergence of violent conflict within these societies. However, once 
group identity and poverty are linked, or a perception of discriminatory treatment can be 
discerned, the propensity towards violent opposition to the state or other groups becomes 
apparent, as can be inferred from the Tamajaq and Jola cases. In general terms poverty can be 
labeled as a possible mobilising factor on condition that it overlaps with group identity. 
Especially, if poverty is conceived as the end result of a conscious political process by which 
specific groups are marginalised or deprived of their resource base its mobilising capacity 
increases manifold. In the next section the focus lies with the relationship between the 
selective nature of some state policies resulting in the promotion of inter group inequality, 
feeding discontent among disenfranchised population groups.  
The impact of state policies on inter-group inequality  
Inter-group inequality 
In West African states there has always been a structural inequality between the administrative 
and industrial centres and the countryside in which a subsistence economy predominates. 
Within this spatial dichotomy the selectively imposed cash-crop production has created a 
dependent peasantry that mostly did not receive adequate compensation from the benefits 
reaped from the export of these products. Instead, the existing spatial inequality was reinforced 
by the deliberate marginalisation of these population groups by the political and economic elite 
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living in the urban areas. The redistribution of various social services to the rural areas was 
only implemented haphazardly and mostly as a direct outcome of patronage networks linking 
elite members to their respective constituencies. In the urban setting, state elites have relied for 
a long time on subsidies on staple foods to co-opt urban constituencies. As a result of the IMF 
and Worldbank imposed austerity programmes most of these subsidies have been abandoned, 
occasionally resulting in widespread urban unrest. Inequality between different groups in the 
rural and urban settings therefore have become more exacerbated, in turn providing a fertile 
recruitment ground for local power brokers, in their quest to wrestle power from the 
incumbent political elite. 
Selective resource exploitation 
Inequality between groups in West African societies has a stronger conflict potential than 
absolute poverty as such. In the Casamance region the selective procedures of land 
expropriation by the state combined with aquatic resource exploitation by non-indigenous 
groups has strengthened the perception among the Jolas that they are systematically exploited 
by the dominant Wolof ethno-linguistic group, as they control state bureaucracy. Although the 
provision of social services by the central government clearly does not disfavour the region in 
comparison to other regions in Senegal, there is a widespread image among the Jola that the 
state fails to deliver services and investments. The Jola represent quite a confusing example of 
deprivation as they deliberately hang on to subsistence practices as a central feature of their 
culture while rejecting the market-oriented productive practices of other groups thus depriving 
themselves of cash-earning activities. Clearly, therefore, socioeconomic factors cannot solely 
account for the Jola insurgency. The negative impact of state policies regarding local resources, 
without taking Jola interests into account, has jeopardised legitimacy of the Senegalese state. 
The state exploits a resource rich area (tourism, fishery, groundnuts, and cotton) but fails to 
compensate its traditional inhabitants adequately. 
In Niger, the division between agriculturists and pastoralists is crucial as specific ethno-
linguistic divides coincide with this dichotomy. Fulani, Arabs, Toubous and Tamajaq are all 
ethno-linguistic groups primarily engaged in the livestock sector. The relative decline of this 
sector due to a breakdown of traditional coping strategies following the droughts that ravaged 
the Sahel in the seventies and eighties has impacted strongly on livelihood strategies for these 
groups. Over the last decades, more and more peasants have become agro-pastoralists blurring 
the rigid boundary between both livelihood strategies. However the Fulani, Toubous and 
Tamajaq remain largely dependent on the livestock sector for survival. As a result Tamajaq 
have attacked sedentary groups in a desperate bid to stem the tide. Moreover, the 
socioeconomic situation of the nomadic ethnic groups has created a structural dependency on 
state resources. As the state proved to be incapable to provide enough relief assistance to these 
communities their hostility towards the central state increased. The state has already exploited 
the resources (uranium) of the Tamajaq heartland in the past, but has never reinvested in the 
area, presently failing to provide compensation for the traditional inhabitants.  
Inter-group violence in Sub Saharan Africa is likely to be the outcome of a political 
process whereby some local groups take on other groups living in the same region, mostly as a 
proxy war for conflicts resulting from the uneven impact of state policies concerning resource 
exploitation. The rationale behind such violence often can be related to selective resource 
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exploitation by the state without concomitant compensation for local stakeholder groups 
concerned. The difference between the Jola and the Tamajaq cases lies in the fact that the 
Senegalese government still has the option to work out a compromise, since the Casamance 
area remains a potentially rich region, whereas the government of Niger has little to offer, as 
the uranium profits have been consumed already, and the Tamajaq areas seem to offer only 
marginal perspectives for future riches. 
Structural limitations to resource extraction 
In general, the mobilising capacity of inter-group inequality is omnipresent in the West African 
context although this does not inevitably lead to violent clashes between contending groups. 
The state, provided it can generate sufficient resources, can soothe some of such potential 
conflicts. However, as has been stated earlier, the state itself rarely constitutes an independent 
entity. Resource availability and extractive capacity through tax collection from the collectivity 
in this context are pivotal factors in the socioeconomic perspective on the emergence of 
violent conflict. Economic development to a large extent determines the potential for state 
extraction of funds to be redistributed through various sectoral budgets. In the case of Africa, 
the economic performance of individual states has been strongly determined by the fluctua-
tions of the international commodity markets. Other important events include the oil crises of 
the early 1970s and several climatic disasters such as the recurrent droughts in the Sahel of 
which those of 1973-1974 and 1984-1985 stand out prominently. The economies of Senegal 
and Niger, in which the conflict cases elaborated in this paper are situated, are extremely 
dependent on single products, groundnuts and uranium respectively. Against the backdrop of 
the structural weaknesses already highlighted this vulnerability has led to budget deficits and 
external indebtedness. Hence, reliance on external sources of income has become extremely 
important for regime survival.  
The fragility of the state system in Sub Saharan Africa 
The ongoing struggle for access to scarce resources in Sub Saharan Africa has led to the 
proliferation of internal conflicts, in which contending elites aim at capturing the ultimate 
prerequisite of power: the state. This process has reinforced the process of state disengagement 
between the state bureaucracy and the inhabitants it is supposed to cater for with the provision 
of services. The exclusionary policies of selected resource exploitation have aggravated this 
situation and undermined the remaining credibility of many states. The impact of external 
meddling aimed at supporting minimal governance conditions through financial support has, at 
best only temporarily halted the process of state disintegration and power struggle between 
contending elites. The cumulative impact of cutbacks on government spending, largely caused 
by external conditions imposed by financial donor institutes, has among others resulted in the 
lay-off of civil servants, the reversal of subsidies for staple foods and the apparent inability to 
compensate for loss of income to elite-supporting sectors of the state apparatus. These conse-
quences have undermined the stability of the fragile state bureaucracies in Sub Saharan Africa, 
in turn triggering discontent and sometimes rebellion of the armed forces or other disgruntled 
groups such as unemployed intellectuals in West Africa.  
As a result, inter-elite competition has worsened and the number of protagonists, involved 
in internal warfare, has increased.  
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Conclusion 
In Sub Saharan Africa, many states lack the capacity to extract sufficient resources to be able to 
provide a minimum level of services to the population at large. The economic dependency of 
many such states has increased because of structural macro-economic limitations. Further-
more, the state has become the prime target for elite competition, effectively crippling its 
potential for conflict mediation. The elite power struggle has increased the existing division 
between the state apparatus and the population, annihilating the embryonic legitimacy of the 
state as an impartial arbiter. Therefore, the state in Sub Saharan Africa needs to reinvent itself 
in order to try and stem the tide of violent political confrontations. In order to try to solve 
resource-related problems and the crucial issue of impartiality in resource distribution to all 
constituent groups in society, the incumbent state elite should adopt a long-term perspective 
based on cross-cutting solidarity between groups who ultimately share the same geographical 
space and are forced to make ends meet with whatever resources are to be found within that 
space. 
Notes 
1. See Georg Frerks, New security challenges: Broadening the Pugwash agenda?, ISYP Journal on 
Science and World Affairs 2 (2) (2006) 51-58 (this issue). 
2. ‘Transhumance’ is a term used for nomadism, where livestock move to follow grazing over 
considerable distances following set seasonal patterns (with the whole family of herders living in 
temporary shelters which move with the herds all the year round). 
3. In 1989 several events coincided: the post elections riots in Dakar in 1989, followed by the Senegal 
river border conflict between Mauretania and Senegal, the dissolution of the Confederation 
Senegambie (1981-1989) and the dispute with Guinee Bissau over potential oil reserves on the 
continental plain off the coast of the Casamance. 
